

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01

NSC-10 NSCE-00 PRS-01 IO-03 PA-01 PM-03 DODE-00 RSR-01

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P R 300840 Z MAR 73

FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2822

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 0950

LIMDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG US IS

SUBJECT: DEBORCHGRAVE/ SADAT INTERVIEW

1. AFTER WAITING FOR MORE THAN THREE WEEKS IN CAIRO, NEWSWEEK SENIOR EDITOR DEBORCHGRAVE WAS GIVEN THREE HOUR INTERVIEW WITH SADAT MARCH 29. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS OF INTERVIEW, GAINED FROM DEBORCHGRAVE'S NOTES AS SHOWN TO USINTOFF MARCH 29 AFTERNOON. DEBORCHGRAVE HAS ASKED THAT THEY BE TREATED WITH UTMOST CONFIDENCE UNTIL INTERVIEW APPEARS IN PRINT. THIS WILL PROBABLY OCCUR IN NEWSWEEK EDITION APPEARING ON STANDS APRIL 2.

2. TONE OF INTERVIEW WAS TOTALLY NEGATIVE FROM BEGINNING. DEBORCHGRAVE ASKED SADAT ABOUT THE RESULTS OF HAFIZ ISMAIL'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON. SADAT SAID THAT DURING THE VISIT, THE US HAD TOLD ISMAIL THAT THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT MUST OPENLY DECLARE ITS RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHTS. HE SAID THAT BEFORE HE HAD ACCEPTED THE US INVITATION TO SEND ISMAIL TO WASHINGTON, HE HAD MADE FOUR POINTS TO THE US: (A) WHAT WAS THE PRESENT US RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL? (B) WHAT WAS THE MEANING OF THE CONTINUOUS SUPPLY OF US MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL? (C) WHAT WAS THE MEANING OF THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE US POSITION ON THE ME THAT HAD BEEN

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STATED BY SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS IN THE PAST? (D) THE US SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD EGYPT DISCUSS THE CESSATION OF ITS TERRITORY.

3. SADAT SAID THAT THE US REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS HAD BEEN NEGATIVE, AND HE HAD REJECTED THIS REPLY. WITHIN 48 HOURS, A MORE POSITIVE REPLY HAD COME. SADAT HAD THEN ACCEPTED THE INVITATION FOR ISMAIL' S VISIT. SADAT SAID THAT IN WASHINGTON, ISMAIL HAD ENCOUNTERED AN AMERICAN INSISTENCE THAT EGYPT MAKE MORE CONCESSIONS. HE REMARKED SARCASTICALLY THAT RATHER THAN LISTEN TO RIDICULOUS US PROPOSALS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR ISMAIL TO TALK DIRECTLY TO MRS. MEIR.

4. SADAT SAID TO DEBORCHGRAVE THAT THERE WAS NOTHING LEFT BUT TO FIGHT. DEBORCHGRAVE ASKED SADAT IF HE SAW ANY WAY OUT OF THE DEADLOCK. SADAT SAID " I HAVE RUN OUT OF IDEAS." HE WAS SERIOUSLY PREPARING EGYPT FOR WAR. DEBORCHGRAVE TRIED TO ARGUE, SAYING THAT EVEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD NEGOTIATED IN THE END TO GAIN WHAT THEY WANTED. SADAT SAID THAT THIS WAS TRUE, BUT THAT THEY HAD NEGOTIATED WHILE FIGHTING. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY, RPT DIRECTLY, WITH ISRAEL, BUT ONLY AFTER THE BATTLE HAD BEGUN. HE SAID THAT THE WORLD MIGHT BE COMPLACENT ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION BUT IT WOULD WAKE UP SHORTLY. EVEN THOUGH THE US THOUGHT IT HAD CALCULATED THE SITUATION ACCURATELY IN GEOPOLITICAL TERMS, ITS CALCULATIONS WERE NOT CORRECT. US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES OF US ACTIONS AND POLICIES. DEBORCHGRAVE SAID TO SADAT THAT HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL WOULD MEAN A DEFEAT FOR EGYPT. SADAT SAID THAT THE ARABS, RPT ARABS, WOULD NOT BE DEFEATED: THEY COULD STAND MILITARY SHOCKS, BUT IN THE END THEY WOULD WIN. CONCERNING HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH QADHAAFI, THERE MIGHT BE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT A UNION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE: IT WOULD. DEBORCHGRAVE ASKED HOW EGYPT COULD GO TO WAR IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT SUPPORT WAR AS A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. SADAT SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE A SAY IN THE MATTER. THEY SUPPORTED EGYPT. THEY CONTINUED TO GIVE EGYPT AS MUCH SUPPORT AS THEY COULD. SADAT SAID HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE ASSISTANCE HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

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5. DEBORCHGRAVE' S MEETING WITH SADAT, OF WHICH ABOVE IS ONLY

A GENERAL OUTLINE, REFLECTED COMPLETELY NEGATIVE EGYPTIAN  
POSITION . DEBORCHGRAVE STATED THAT TOWARD THE END OF INTERVIEW  
GHORBAL, WHO WAS PRESENT, TRIED TO GET SADAT TO TERMINATE IT  
ON AN UPBEAT. SADAT WOULD NOT. AT THE END, IN AN OFF THE  
RECORD CONVERSATION, DEBORCHGRAVE TOLD SADAT THAT THE IMPRESSION  
HE HAD GAINED DURING HIS STAY IN EGYPT WAS THAT NO ONE  
BELIEVED WAR WAS A SOLUTION , AND THAT EVEN MANY MEMBERS OF  
SADAT' S OWN GOVERNMENT WANTED TO GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF  
A SETTLEMENT. SADAT SAID THAT THERE MIGHT BE SUCH PEOPLE,  
BUT THAT THEY WOULD SHORTLY HAVE A RUDE AWAKENING.  
GREENE

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